But all along, Chinese companies didn’t necessarily need to smuggle chips into the country to use them. They could just rent computing power from data centers in other countries, and best of all, the practice didn’t violate US export controls. This wasn’t some hidden loophole—every policymaker and researcher who worked on the chip restrictions was deeply aware of it. So why let the practice continue?
For one, renting computing power can be more expensive and cumbersome than owning the chips outright, especially for companies that need to train large AI models over long periods. Some analysts argued that allowing Chinese firms to use American technology overseas could help keep them dependent on it instead of pushing them to develop domestic alternatives. Restricting access would also be difficult to enforce and could hurt US technology companies.
Now, Washington is moving into this territory anyway. Monday’s announcement represents another significant expansion of US efforts to control China’s technological development. In 2022, Washington set out to prevent Chinese companies from acquiring certain American chips. Four years later, it’s trying to regulate how Chinese companies use those same chips, even when the hardware never enters China.
Whether that’s a good idea depends partly on how much the original restrictions have actually accomplished.
There is evidence that export controls have made it considerably harder for Chinese AI companies to acquire the kind of computing power of their American competitors. But assessing the precise impact of the policies has proven to be extremely difficult.
This strategy comes with a lot of risks, and like with everything else in life, there are real winners and losers. For example, forcing US chip companies to cut off Chinese customers has come at a cost to American companies. In a study of earlier US export restrictions, researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that affected American suppliers struggled to replace lost business in China with new customers elsewhere. They estimate that the restrictions wiped $130 billion from the companies’ combined market value, while also hurting their profitability and employment.
The restrictions have also given China a very powerful incentive to find ways to compete in AI without relying on American technology. Huawei, for example, developed a way to link powerful chips together to create larger, more powerful megachip systems. The Chinese AI lab DeepSeek proved to the world that finding ways to make training more efficient could help developers build competitive models with fewer resources.
I worry that the Trump administration will soon find that it has gotten out over its own skis. It’s now trying to control not only which chips Chinese companies can buy from American companies, but also how they can use American technology anywhere it may be in the world. I’m not sure that is the kind of responsibility I want to bestow on anyone in response to what happened in one person’s sex life.
This is an edition of Will Knight’s AI Lab newsletter. Read previous newsletters here.
