
Two exploits on Ethereum have drained an estimated $4.48 million from K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault and Gonka’s bridge, according to separate Blockaid alerts on Nov. 18.
Summary
- K3 Capital paused contracts tied to sBOLD after Blockaid reported a $3.43 million drain.
- Blockaid put the Gonka bridge drain at $1.05 million and reported that unbacked WGNK had been minted.
- Bitquery later counted 97 transactions in the sBOLD drain and traced $1.78 million in payments to Ethereum block builders.
Blockchain security firm Blockaid estimated that roughly $3.43 million had left the sBOLD vault across about 34 transactions when it flagged the K3 Capital exploit. K3 Capital said at 13:08 UTC that it was investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD and had paused contracts. The company’s initial notice gave neither a loss estimate nor a timetable for reopening the vault.
In a separate alert, Blockaid said about $1.05 million had been realized from the Gonka bridge drain across roughly five transactions. The firm said the incident was still underway when it posted the estimate. Its alert described the minting of unbacked WGNK alongside the reserve drain.
The $4.48 million combined estimate uses the two dollar amounts in Blockaid’s alerts, with no separate value assigned to the newly issued tokens.
K3 Capital pauses sBOLD as researchers trace the vault losses
Liquity’s documentation identifies sBOLD as a third-party vault developed and maintained by K3 Capital. It pools deposits of BOLD, the dollar-pegged stablecoin issued by Liquity V2, and automatically reinvests rewards earned through Liquity’s Stability Pools. Vault shares represent a depositor’s stake in the pooled assets.
Liquity V2 has a separate Stability Pool for each of its three collateral markets, which use wrapped ether, wrapped staked ether, and Rocket Pool’s rETH. According to Liquity, the pools use deposited BOLD to cover debt when a borrower’s position is liquidated.
Pool depositors receive collateral from those positions alongside a share of the interest borrowers pay. K3’s vault handles the reinvestment for users who deposit through sBOLD.
Blockaid said the sBOLD exploit let attackers obtain vault shares at a low cost and redeem them for BOLD that belonged to other depositors. Bitquery’s subsequent analysis put the vault loss at $3.42 million by its own pricing and counted 97 transactions over 37 Ethereum blocks. It attributed 57 of those transactions to one bot and estimated that transactions linked to the bot accounted for 56% of the value removed from the vault.
Bitquery traced $1.78 million in payments to block builders, which assemble and order transactions before they are added to Ethereum. That works out to about 52% of the loss Bitquery calculated. The payments came out of the money removed from the vault. Bitquery said it found no indication that the builders knew what the bot was doing.
The later review puts the drain in an eight-minute window, from 12:25:23 to 12:33:35 UTC. Bitquery said the vault lost everything it held during that period, roughly 35 minutes before K3 Capital announced the pause. The firm’s review covered Ethereum balances through 16:14 UTC on Nov. 18.
The two accounts differed on what happened inside Liquity. Blockaid’s initial alert pointed to a liquidation of a borrower’s position, known in Liquity as a trove. Bitquery said its transaction review found no trove liquidations. The initial statement from K3 Capital did not give the company’s own account of what caused the vault losses.
The vault incident follows a separate episode in February 2025 when Liquity urged users to exit its V2 Stability Pools while it investigated a potential issue. More than $17 million left in 24 hours after the warning, crypto.news previously reported, citing Liquity V2 outflows tracked by DefiLlama. Liquity announced in May 2025 that V2 was live following further audits and testing.
Gonka bridge loses stablecoins and unbacked WGNK is minted
Blockaid attributed the Gonka incident to a change involving the signing key for the project’s Ethereum bridge. It said the attacker emptied the stablecoins still held in the bridge and minted WGNK, the Ethereum version of Gonka’s native GNK token, without backing.
Under normal operation, Gonka’s bridge documentation says stablecoins such as USDT and USDC can be locked on Ethereum, so their wrapped versions can circulate on Gonka. When a holder moves the assets back, the bridge releases the original stablecoins held on Ethereum. The reserve balance serves those redemptions.
A transfer of GNK in the other direction uses a separate balance. Gonka’s documentation says native GNK goes into escrow on the Gonka network, and an equivalent quantity of WGNK is then issued on Ethereum. The bridge contract doubles as the WGNK token contract.
Under the standard return process, the contract burns WGNK on Ethereum, and Gonka releases the corresponding GNK from escrow.
